Stripped of Dignity: The Struggle for LGBT Rights in Tanzania
Posted: 17 March, 2017 Filed under: Daniel Marari | Tags: consensual sex, constitution, discrimination, equality, gender identity, hate crimes, HIV/Aids, homosexuality, imprisonment, LGBT, LGBTI, Penal Code, prosecution, sexual minorities, Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, sexual orientation, Tanzania, unnatural offence, violence 7 Comments
Author: Daniel Marari
LLM, International Human Rights Law, Lund University, Sweden
Although the Tanzanian Constitution (1977) guarantees the right to equality and prohibits discrimination based on gender and sex, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people still face deeply rooted hostility, prejudice and widespread discrimination in the Tanzanian society. Threats of criminal penalty, social exclusion, harassment and violence make it particularly unsafe for one to come out as an LGBT person.
At present, certain homosexual acts between consenting adult males are criminalized under the Penal Code (Chapter 16 of the laws). Under section 154 of the Penal Code, committing or attempting to commit “unnatural offences” are crimes punishable with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and twenty years’ imprisonment, respectively. “Unnatural offence” is defined as (1) sexual intercourse with any person “against the order of nature” as well as (2) consensual sexual intercourse between a man and man or woman “against the order of nature”. The words “against the order of nature” are not statutorily defined. Also, under section 157 of the Penal Code, it is an offence punishable with a maximum of five years imprisonment for any male person, whether in public or private, to commit an act of gross indecency with another male person. By section 3 of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, “gross indecency” is defined as “any sexual act that is more than ordinary but falls short of actual intercourse and may include masturbation and indecent physical contact or indecent behavior without any physical contact”. Consent is no defense to any of these offences and no distinction regarding age is made in the text of the law. As the consequence of the existence of these laws criminalizing private consensual homosexual acts, LGBT people in Tanzania live in psychological stress and unceasing fear of prosecution and imprisonment.
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The upcoming Hate Crimes Bill: A welcome development in the fight against xenophobia and hate crimes in South Africa
Posted: 5 August, 2016 Filed under: Gideon Muchiri | Tags: Abubacarr Saidykhan, belief, birth, constitution, crime, culture, disability, Equality Act, ethnic or social origin, gender, gender identity, Hate Crimes Bill, hate speech, human rights, language, law, legislation, monitoring mechanism, National Prosecution Authority, nationality, NPA, occupation, police, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, race, religion, sex, sexual orientat, South Africa, South African Constitution, victim, xenophobia 1 Comment
Author: Gideon Muchiri
LLD student, Department of Jurisprudence, University of Pretoria
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) of South Africa is working on the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes Bill,[1] due for tabling in Parliament in September 2016. This Bill, if enacted into law, will strengthen the role of law enforcement officials including the police, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and courts in holding perpetrators of hate crimes, including xenophobic conduct, legally accountable for not only the criminal acts committed, but also for the hate motive. The new law will foster a rights-based approach to enhancement of the rights of victims and thus send a clear and unequivocal message to the society that crimes motivated by hate and xenophobia will not be tolerated in South Africa and are subject to punishment.
The right to happiness in Africa
Posted: 13 July, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: Africa, apartheid, Christopher Mbazira, colonialism, constitution, David Bilchitz, economic development, Egypt, employment, Frederick Fourie, freedom, Ghana, Justice Albie Sachs, Leopold Sadar Senghor, Liberia, liberty, Namibia, Nigeria, racism, right to happiness, right to life, safety, security, South Africa, Steve Biko, Stu Woolan, Swaziland 3 Comments
Author: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Leopold Sedar Senghor said: emotion is African.[1] This emotion has been channeled to constitutions. Happiness is a core value in many African constitutions. It was explicitly mentioned in Liberia, Namibia, Ghana, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Egypt.
Article 1 of the Constitution of Liberia, 1986, proclaims that all free governments are instituted by the people’s authority, for their benefit, and they have the right to alter and reform it when their safety and ‘happiness’ require it.[2] The preamble of the Egyptian Constitution, 2014, cites ‘a place of common happiness for its people’. The Namibian Constitution, 1990, assures the right ‘to the pursuit of happiness’. In this regard, Frederick Fourie defends the preamble of the Namibian Constitution, explaining that it is coloured by the struggle against colonialism and racism; that it is built around the denial of the ‘right of the individual life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ by colonialism, racism and apartheid.[3]
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the enforceability problem
Posted: 8 July, 2016 Filed under: Olika Daniel Godson | Tags: Africa, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Apex Court, constitution, constitutional provisions, economic, enforceability, enforcement, human rights, International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, law, legislation, litigation, Nigeria, Supreme Court 4 Comments
Author: Olika Daniel Godson
Student (LLB) Faculty of Law, University of Lagos
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) provides for economic, social and cultural rights in rather grand and lofty terms in form of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the Constitution. These rights are however denied enforceability under the Constitution as it prefers to see them as goals and objectives which the Government is to strive to attain. This denial of enforceability of these rights contained in this Chapter of the Constitution poses a major problem to human rights activism in the Country, as the specific rights contained in that Chapter of the Constitution are worthy of enforcement in this age and time. Some of those rights include; cultural, labour, economic, political, environmental and educational rights. It therefore comes, now and again, to the fore that some of these rights are not being enforced in the country. This article attempts to analyse the enforceability problem and address some strategies for enforcement.
Uganda: Why the Constitutional Court should rule on the right to health
Posted: 3 June, 2016 Filed under: Michael Addaney | Tags: African Court of Justice and Human Rights, anemia, child birth, constitution, Constitutional Court of Uganda, diabetes, doctrine of political question, duty to fulfil, duty to respect, government health facilities, hepatitis, Kenya, malaria, maternal health, maternal mortality, obligation to protect, public health, South Africa, Supreme Court, Uganda, universal human rights 2 Comments
Author: Michael Addaney
Senior Research Assistant, University of Energy and Natural Resources, Ghana
A case currently before the Constitutional Court of Uganda is providing an interesting test for how far courts can go in protecting basic human rights. Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings. Every person is equally entitled to them without discrimination. They are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.
Universal human rights are often guaranteed by law through treaties and various sources of international law which generally oblige governments to respect, protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.
Apart from international obligations, countries have various ways of entrenching human rights. Most contemporary constitutions entrench basic human rights. Such constitutions include the 1996 Constitution of South Africa and the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. Likewise, the 1995 Constitution of Uganda contains the Bill of Rights that guarantees fundamental freedoms and basic rights including the rights to health and to life.
Happiness as constitutional empowerment in Nigeria
Posted: 20 May, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: Bamidele Aturu, capitalism, constitution, Constitutional rights, Easterlin’s Paradox, economic power, Femi Aborisade, Frantz Fanon, GDP, Justice M. Bello, materialism, Nigeria, oil, petroleum, resistance, right to happiness, socio-economic well-being, Steve Biko, sustainable economy, welfare 5 CommentsAuthor: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
In Nigeria, happiness is understood as a Constitutional right and is more than a mere linguistic expression. Section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that ‘the State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which provisions are made in this Constitution, control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and “happiness” of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity’. Nigeria thus constitutionalized happiness as part as its movement toward to a sustainable economy. This prevents the interference of economy with the people’s happiness.[1]
Nigeria shows how commitment to peoples’ happiness is able to diminish the strength of money in areas which must not be sold, thus emphasizing that there are things that money cannot buy. The African collective trauma caused by the intense economic exploitation conducted by the colonial system shows its value by inserting limitative factor into a constitutional provision in order to face the eventual side effects of unlimited economic power. The Nigerian government’s decision to deregulate the pricing of petroleum, the nation’s most valuable asset, ended up in court in a case which reached landmark status.
Challenging anti-terrorism laws in Swaziland: When the judiciary becomes the stumbling block
Posted: 11 May, 2016 Filed under: Kudzani Ndlovu | Tags: Amnesty International, colonial legacy, constitution, democracy, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and information, human rights, monarchy, Peoples United Democratic Movement, repression, Sediction Act, STA, Swaziland, Swaziland Solidarity Network, Swaziland Youth Congress, terrorism, Thulani Maseko 1 Comment
Author: Kudzani Ndlovu
Part-time lecturer, Lupane State University, Zimbabwe
On 8 and 9 February 2016 the pro-democracy movement in Swaziland converged at the High Court in Mbabane to attend a hearing on the constitutionality of the country’s two draconian and repressive laws – the Suppression of Terrorism Act No. 3 of 2008 (STA) and the British colonial era 1938 Sedition and Subversive Activities Act (Sedition Act) – which continue to be used by the state to stifle opposition and silence critics of the authoritarian monarchy.
Many, especially those outside Africa’s last absolute monarchy, had labelled this hearing as ‘historic’ but local activists remained less optimistic knowing that most of the country’s judges have sold their independence for thirty pieces of silver. The King’s influence in the appointment of judges has seriously undermined the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution of Swaziland provides that the judges are appointed by the King after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Judges are answerable to the King and hence they can never claim to be independent. It will only take rabid denialists and anarchists to argue that there is hope of an independent judiciary in Swaziland under the current system.
Happiness and same-sex affection
Posted: 22 April, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: autonomy of will, Brazil, Chinelo Okparanta, Civil Code, constitution, fundamental rights, gay, happiness, homo-affectionate, hope of happiness, human dignity, Justice Celso de Mello, Justice Luiz Fux, love, Nigeria, prejudice, privacy, protection of the right to life, right to equal protection under the law, right to happiness, same-sex affection, same-sex couples, same-sex marriage, sexual discrimination, sexual minorities, United States Declaration of Independence 3 CommentsAuthor: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Chinelo Okparanta is a Nigerian writer, currently living as a citizen in the United States. She understands the prejudices of her native country, especially against homosexuals. In some parts of Nigeria, a gay individual may be stoned to death under the Shari’a law. Okparanta writes, in her lesbian romance Happiness like Water, ‘yes, our love may be hidden, but it is strong. It can still bring happiness’.[1]
Why must the love between two consenting adults be hidden? Should the State have the power to decide towards whom one may show affection? These disconcerting questions may be answered in terms of global Constitutions.
The most important Brazilian decision which entailed the right to happiness was in 2011.[2] The Supreme Court had to rule on the interpretation to be given to article 1.723 of the Civil Code, which only recognizes a common-law relationship between a man and a woman as a family unit which must be public knowledge, continuous, and long-lasting, and be established for the purpose of building a family. The need for the aforementioned ruling resulted from the fact that government bodies refused to grant these rights to homo-affectionate couples. Therefore, the Court had to decide if this union also covered same-sex couples, even though the provision expressly mentions ‘man and a woman’.[3]
Ghana’s Human Rights Court gives life to the right to information
Posted: 15 April, 2016 Filed under: Michael Gyan Nyarko | Tags: 116 buses, access to justice, Attorney General of Ghana, branding, BRT, Bus Rapid Transit, civic duty, constitution, freedom of information, Ghana, Ghana’s Public Procurement Act, High Court of Ghana, human rights, Human Rights Division, Minister of Transport, Parliament of Ghana, procurement, public property, right to information, transparency 3 Comments
Author: Michael Gyan Nyarko
Doctoral Candidate and Academic Tutor, Centre for Human Rights; Editor: AfricLaw.com
Ghana has been described as ‘a beacon of hope in Africa’ on account of its good governance and respect for human rights.’[1] With a fairly liberal constitution which guarantees quite an elaborate list of civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights, political stability and economic growth over the past two decades, this description of Ghana is not farfetched. While Ghana has performed reasonably well with regards to respect for human rights, there still remain several human rights issues that require urgent attention. One of those issues is the right to information.
The right to information is guaranteed and entrenched in the Constitution.[2] Article 21(1)(f) of the Constitutions provides that ‘all persons shall have the right to information, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society’. However, this right has not been effectively enjoyed as government has failed to enact a right to information law to give effect to the constitutional provision. A right to information bill proposed by successive governments has been pending for over a decades. The absence of a right to information law has left a vacuum where citizens do not have clarity on whom to approach for official government information, which information may not be requested and what financial burden they may bear for such request. This has resulted in the rather limited use of the right to information, especially with regards to request for official government documents.
Constitutional jurisdiction and the right to happiness
Posted: 1 April, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction, Community Law Centre, constitution, Constitutional Court, Council of Censors, Delft, fundamental right, Greatest Happiness principle, Hans Kelsen, happiness, individualism, Joshua Greene, judiciary, Langa, law, normative acts, right to dignity, right to happiness, utilitarian doctrine 7 CommentsAuthor: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Should it be a role of the Judiciary to assure happiness for the people? Is it appropriate for a Constitutional Court to consider happiness to be a right? Does the establishment of fundamental rights expand the collective happiness? To answer these questions, it is essential to examine the root of Constitutional jurisdiction.
Karl Loewenstein questioned whether the Constitution would be “instrumental for the pursuit of happiness of the people”,[1] based on his intrigue into the purpose and meaning of a Constitution. He is accompanied by Hans Kelsen, for whom “the longing for justice is man’s eternal longing for happiness”.[2]
The answer to the aforementioned questions lies within the examination of the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania, in the United States, in 1776, in order to address the power given to the courts to assess the constitutionality of the laws and of normative acts.
AfricLaw 