Happiness and same-sex affection
Posted: 22 April, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: autonomy of will, Brazil, Chinelo Okparanta, Civil Code, constitution, fundamental rights, gay, happiness, homo-affectionate, hope of happiness, human dignity, Justice Celso de Mello, Justice Luiz Fux, love, Nigeria, prejudice, privacy, protection of the right to life, right to equal protection under the law, right to happiness, same-sex affection, same-sex couples, same-sex marriage, sexual discrimination, sexual minorities, United States Declaration of Independence 3 CommentsAuthor: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Chinelo Okparanta is a Nigerian writer, currently living as a citizen in the United States. She understands the prejudices of her native country, especially against homosexuals. In some parts of Nigeria, a gay individual may be stoned to death under the Shari’a law. Okparanta writes, in her lesbian romance Happiness like Water, ‘yes, our love may be hidden, but it is strong. It can still bring happiness’.[1]
Why must the love between two consenting adults be hidden? Should the State have the power to decide towards whom one may show affection? These disconcerting questions may be answered in terms of global Constitutions.
The most important Brazilian decision which entailed the right to happiness was in 2011.[2] The Supreme Court had to rule on the interpretation to be given to article 1.723 of the Civil Code, which only recognizes a common-law relationship between a man and a woman as a family unit which must be public knowledge, continuous, and long-lasting, and be established for the purpose of building a family. The need for the aforementioned ruling resulted from the fact that government bodies refused to grant these rights to homo-affectionate couples. Therefore, the Court had to decide if this union also covered same-sex couples, even though the provision expressly mentions ‘man and a woman’.[3]
Constitutional jurisdiction and the right to happiness
Posted: 1 April, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction, Community Law Centre, constitution, Constitutional Court, Council of Censors, Delft, fundamental right, Greatest Happiness principle, Hans Kelsen, happiness, individualism, Joshua Greene, judiciary, Langa, law, normative acts, right to dignity, right to happiness, utilitarian doctrine 7 CommentsAuthor: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Should it be a role of the Judiciary to assure happiness for the people? Is it appropriate for a Constitutional Court to consider happiness to be a right? Does the establishment of fundamental rights expand the collective happiness? To answer these questions, it is essential to examine the root of Constitutional jurisdiction.
Karl Loewenstein questioned whether the Constitution would be “instrumental for the pursuit of happiness of the people”,[1] based on his intrigue into the purpose and meaning of a Constitution. He is accompanied by Hans Kelsen, for whom “the longing for justice is man’s eternal longing for happiness”.[2]
The answer to the aforementioned questions lies within the examination of the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania, in the United States, in 1776, in order to address the power given to the courts to assess the constitutionality of the laws and of normative acts.