Recalibrating Nigeria’s Whistleblowing Policy: An urgent plea for a comprehensive whistleblower protection legislation

Author: Olabisi D Akinkugbe
PhD candidate at the University of Ottawa, Canada

This short essay draws attention to the current gap in regulatory framework for the protection of whistleblowers in Nigeria and its potential to derail any meaningful sustained and long-term success of the country’s nascent whistleblower program. The other socio-political factors that would contribute to the effectiveness of the program in Nigeria are discussed in a forthcoming article by the author.

Whistleblowing refers to the public interest disclosure of information by members of an organization or government employees about illegal and immoral practices by other employees or other persons who deal with the organization, such as contractors, in the case of public governance. Employees are often the first to recognize malpractice, fraud, dishonest and illegal activity, or other wrongdoing with potential impact on the public interest. As a public governance integrity enhancing mechanism, it is primarily linked to encouraging and enhancing the public disclosure of wrongdoing in order to improve accountability and transparency.

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Ghana’s Human Rights Court gives life to the right to information

michael_gyan_nyarkoAuthor: Michael Gyan Nyarko
Doctoral Candidate and Academic Tutor, Centre for Human Rights; Editor: AfricLaw.com

Ghana has been described as ‘a beacon of hope in Africa’ on account of its good governance and respect for human rights.’[1] With a fairly liberal constitution which guarantees quite an elaborate list of civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights, political stability and economic growth over the past two decades, this description of Ghana is not farfetched.  While Ghana has performed reasonably well with regards to respect for human rights, there still remain several human rights issues that require urgent attention. One of those issues is the right to information.

The right to information is guaranteed and entrenched in the Constitution.[2] Article 21(1)(f) of the Constitutions provides that ‘all persons shall have the right to information, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society’.  However, this right has not been effectively enjoyed as government has failed to enact a right to information law to give effect to the constitutional provision. A right to information bill proposed by successive governments has been pending for over a decades. The absence of a right to information law has left a vacuum where citizens do not have clarity on whom to approach for official government information, which information may not be requested and what financial burden they may bear for such request. This has resulted in the rather limited use of the right to information, especially with regards to request for official government documents.

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Should the African Union be accountable and answerable to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights?

Roopanand Amar MahadewAuthor: Roopanand Amar Mahadew
Doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Court) has recently delivered a judgment in the case of Femi Falana v The African Union. The judgment is rather controversial on various levels. Firstly, the Court decided to interpret Articles 5(3) and 34(6) which, read jointly, imply that individuals or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can have access to the Court only if the state from which they are has deposited the declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 34(6). This was certainly not the issue in the Falana case. What had to be determined was whether the African Union (AU), which is not a state party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or the Protocol establishing the African Court (the Protocol), could be sued and such an interrogation required the interpretation of Articles 3, 30 and 34 (1&4) of the Protocol. Secondly, the Court, at the very onset, failed to consider whether or not it has jurisdiction ratione personae and decided to proceed to judicial consideration of the applications which is procedurally flawed.

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