Tanzanian Court: Third party consent to marriage of girls under 18 is unconstitutional
Posted: 18 January, 2017 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentTanzanian Court: Third party consent to marriage of girls under 18 is unconstitutional
Many thanks to Godfrey Kangaude, LL.M. (UFS), LL.M. (UCLA), an LL.D. candidate at the University of Pretoria and Executive Director of Nyale Institute for Sexual and Reproductive Health Governance in Malawi, for summarizing this decision for REPROHEALTHLAW subscribers. He is also Chief Editor of Legal Grounds III: Reproductive and Sexual Rights in Sub-Saharan African Courts, forthcoming 2017.
Rebeca Z. Gyumi v. Attorney General, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 5 of 2016 decided on July 8, 2016. (High Court of Tanzania, unreported) Decision online.
Abstract: The Court considered whether by permitting girls under the age of 18 to marry by third party consent, Sections 13 and 17 of the Marriage Act CAP R.E. 2002 (Marriage Act) violate the right to equality, the right to expression and receipt of information as provided for under Articles 12, 13, 18 and 21 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania…
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South Africa’s intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Time to seriously consider an African alternative?
Posted: 28 October, 2016 Filed under: Owiso Owiso | Tags: Africa, African Charter, African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, African Court of Justice and Human Rights, African Union, AU, Election and Governance, frican Charter on Democracy, human rights, ICC, impunity, International Criminal Court, International Criminal law, justice, Kenya, Malabo Protocol, Omar Al-Bashir, Rome Statute, South Africa, Sudan, Uhuru Kenyatta, United Nations, United Nations Security Council, William Ruto 1 Comment
Author: Owiso Owiso
LLB – Nairobi, PGD Law – KSL
While the decision by South Africa to commence the formal process of withdrawing from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is shocking, honest observers will admit it was not entirely unforeseen. African countries through the African Union (AU) have long voiced misgivings about the International Criminal Court (ICC) and it was just a matter of time before the usually slow-moving AU clock started ticking. The AU had earlier this year urged its members to consider withdrawing from the Rome Statute.[1] This was triggered by the refusal by the United Nations Security Council and the ICC to accede to the AU’s requests for suspension or termination of the cases against Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir and his Kenyan counterpart Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto.
While South Africa’s decision should be condemned, nothing much is likely to come of such condemnation. Treaties are a product of state consent[2] and it follows that withdrawal is equally a unilateral act of the state.[3] Even if an argument could be advanced against such unilateralism, the process is still a political one which rests almost entirely with the political class, at least in imperfect democracies. South Africa’s move is likely to embolden other African countries to commence similar processes. South Africa is Africa’s biggest economy and the AU’s largest member contributor. It is also arguably one of Africa’s better-off imperfect democracies. For these reasons, it is often the case in continental affairs that other African countries hold on to their cards until South Africa plays after which they emerge from their cocoons and play theirs in more or less similar fashion. With the possible exception of ‘righteous’ Botswana and perhaps Mauritius that considers itself African only when the situation suits it, the possibility that other African countries will follow South Africa’s lead on the ICC cannot be ruled out. In light of such possibility, how then does Africa assure its citizens that the fight against impunity as is entrenched in its founding instrument[4] is still top of its agenda, if at all it ever was?
Rethinking the North-South divide in international criminal justice: Reflections from an African viewpoint
Posted: 25 October, 2016 Filed under: Francis Dusabe | Tags: accountability, Africa, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, African Union, AU, collaboration, courts, Hissène Habré, ICC, International Criminal Court, international criminal justice, International Criminal law, law, regional mechanisms, Rome Statute 2 Comments
Author: Francis Dusabe
Legal Researcher
‘Whatever you do for me but without me, you do against me’– Mahatma Gandhi, 1869-1948
More than ever before, Africa is at both sides of the coin; it is the subject of international criminal law because African states have steadfastly stood for the creation of the International Criminal Court and an object of international criminal law because of the unfortunate participation of Africans in atrocities that ravages their continent.
Unlike what many think, Africa has a lot to offer in the development of international criminal law, be it at domestic, regional and international level. Domestically, Africa leads other continents in the nationalisation of international criminal law either through domestication of the Rome Statute or the incorporation of main principles of international criminal law as enshrined in major conventions and treaties in national law.
The 2016 Zambia presidential election petition: How not to handle election petitions
Posted: 16 September, 2016 Filed under: Owiso Owiso | Tags: Africa, amendment, Constitution of Kenya 2010, Constitution of Zambia, Constitutional Court of Zambia, constitutional provisions, Edgar Chagwa Lungu, elections, Hakainde Hichilema, legislative drafting, president-elect, presidential election petition, Zambia 5 Comments
Author: Owiso Owiso
LLB – Nairobi, PGD Law – KSL
If the drama that was Hakainde Hichilema v Edgar Chagwa Lungu (2016/CC/0031) has any lessons for the continent, it is how not to adjudicate upon a presidential election petition. Three judges of the court effectively succeeded in making an unfortunate mockery of their bench and risking the otherwise good image Zambia’s electoral process has enjoyed for a few decades now. We should, however, not be too quick to cast aspersions on the court and the learned judges. In order to understand what transpired in the Constitutional Court of Zambia, we have to look at the relevant legal provisions guiding presidential election petitions.
International human rights advocacy and the abolition of irreducible life imprisonment in Zimbabwe
Posted: 13 September, 2016 Filed under: Andrew Novak | Tags: Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe, Death Penalty Project, domestic law, European Court of Human Rights, foreign jurisprudence, global jurisprudenc, human rights, international death penalty litigation, international human rights norms, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, Justice Bharat Patel, law reform, life without parole, Makoni v. Commissioner of Prisons, parole, Prisons Act, rehabilitative criminal sentences, South African Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Namibia, Tendai Biti, transnational human rights, transnational human rights advocates, Veritas Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Leave a comment
Author: Andrew Novak
Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason University
On July 13, 2016, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe (ConCourt) found that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional as it violated the rights to equal protection and human dignity and the prohibition on cruel and degrading punishment. The decision, Makoni v. Commissioner of Prisons, is undoubtedly a victory for human rights, due to the dismal state of prison conditions in Zimbabwe and the emotional and psychological harm caused by indeterminate sentences. In its decision, the ConCourt cited a wide range of jurisprudence from foreign and international courts, including the European Court of Human Rights, South African Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Namibia, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London to discern a global trend toward rehabilitative criminal sentences. Many of these foreign and international legal sources were brought to the ConCourt’s attention by transnational human rights lawyers themselves in their Heads of Argument, underscoring the important role that advocates play in the diffusion of international human rights norms.
The right to happiness in Africa
Posted: 13 July, 2016 Filed under: Saul Leal | Tags: Africa, apartheid, Christopher Mbazira, colonialism, constitution, David Bilchitz, economic development, Egypt, employment, Frederick Fourie, freedom, Ghana, Justice Albie Sachs, Leopold Sadar Senghor, Liberia, liberty, Namibia, Nigeria, racism, right to happiness, right to life, safety, security, South Africa, Steve Biko, Stu Woolan, Swaziland 3 Comments
Author: Saul Leal
Vice-Chancellor Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA)
Leopold Sedar Senghor said: emotion is African.[1] This emotion has been channeled to constitutions. Happiness is a core value in many African constitutions. It was explicitly mentioned in Liberia, Namibia, Ghana, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Egypt.
Article 1 of the Constitution of Liberia, 1986, proclaims that all free governments are instituted by the people’s authority, for their benefit, and they have the right to alter and reform it when their safety and ‘happiness’ require it.[2] The preamble of the Egyptian Constitution, 2014, cites ‘a place of common happiness for its people’. The Namibian Constitution, 1990, assures the right ‘to the pursuit of happiness’. In this regard, Frederick Fourie defends the preamble of the Namibian Constitution, explaining that it is coloured by the struggle against colonialism and racism; that it is built around the denial of the ‘right of the individual life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ by colonialism, racism and apartheid.[3]

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