What is next after the graduation of the necessary unified forces?
Posted: 20 September, 2022 Filed under: Garang Yach James | Tags: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, Civil Defence, complex geopolitics, Equatoria region, lack of political will, national army, National Police Service, national security, political will, Prison Services, RACRSS, Republic of South Sudan, Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflicts in South Sudan, security implications, South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, SPLA-IO, Transitional Security Arrangement, unified forces, Wildlife Leave a commentAuthor: Garang Yach J
South Sudanese Political and security analyst and PhD Student, University of Juba, South Sudan
Summary
The article attempts to answer the question of what is next after the parties have finally graduated the long-awaited necessary unified forces in accordance with the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflicts in South Sudan (RACRSS). It identifies four key issues and their respective security implications at the center of the transitional security arrangements. The author concludes that the graduation of the necessary unified forces is not the surest guarantee of a stabilised security situation although it is a show of political will that has been lacking since the coming to effect of the RARCSS in 2018. Addressing the identified key dilemmas will in turn address their respective security implications thus tranquilise the problematic security situation across the country.
The author ends by giving three pertinent recommendations for policy action if the transitional security arrangements were to set a stage for a democratic South Sudan by the end of the 24-month extended period.
The decline of democracy and the rise of coup d’états in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reflections and lessons
Posted: 25 February, 2022 Filed under: Garang Yach James | Tags: civil unrest, civil uprisings, coup d'états, gun class, human insecurities, human security, Independent Electoral Commission, militarisation of politics, military takeover, political fiasco, Republic of South Sudan, South Sudan military, stable democracies, structural inequalities Leave a commentAuthor: Garang Yach J
South Sudanese Political and security analyst and PhD Student, University of Juba, South Sudan
Summary
Although coup d’états have been straddling the African continent since the 1960s, their recent resurfacing and rise is a reverse to the democratic consolidation in the Sub-Saharan African region. In this article I try to locate the trends of coups in the history of the region in order to showcase the existing susceptibility of the states in the region. I further advance the argument that militarisation of politics, the dominant military aristocracy and proclivity to change constitutions in order to extend term and age limits, delays in holding free and fair elections are among the reasons why democracy is declining, and coups are on rise in the region. I also present a compelling argument that failure to incorporate human security into governance is stifling democracy and resuscitation of coup tendencies. The article concludes that military metiers in the Sub-Saharan region have entrenched themselves and apply mock democracy to actuate militaristic propensity. Finally, the article gives four recommendations that would improve democratic governance and mitigate trends of unconstitutional change of government in the region.
What type of federalism should South Sudan adopt and why?
Posted: 12 January, 2022 Filed under: Joseph Geng Akech | Tags: Administrative Areas, constitution, constitution building process, ethnic federalism, federalism, governance, governance framework, International IDEA, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Ministry of Federal Affairs of the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity, Republic of South Sudan, Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity, RTGoNU, South Sudan, territorial federalism 1 CommentAuthor: Joseph Geng Akech
South Sudanese human rights lawyer and PhD candidate, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Summary
This article spotlights existing debates under the on-going constitutional design process on the type of federalism South Sudan should adopt. It is a debate with varying and potentially divisive perspectives. Dominant proposals in these debates are territorial and ethnic federalism. I join this debate with an open mind, and I therefore try to refrain from taking sides. This article thus tries to bring to fore, the underlying arguments in both perspectives and makes three recommendations to break the impasse. The first option is to conduct a referendum for the public to decide while the second calls for a scientific comparative study on performances of both territorial and ethnic federalism. The third calls for open and transparent public debates on the type of federalism South Sudan should adopt.
The transitional national legislature is to be transformed into a constituent assembly to adopt the ‘permanent’ constitution of South Sudan, but what does this mean?
Posted: 25 October, 2021 Filed under: Joseph Geng Akech | Tags: Constituent Assembly, constitution building, constitution making processes, Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC), Draft Constitutional Text, legislation, National Constitutional Conference (NCC), National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), Preparatory Sub-Committee, R-ARCSS, Republic of South Sudan, Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Unelected national legislature Leave a commentAuthor: Joseph Geng Akech
South Sudanese human rights lawyer and LLD candidate, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Introduction
The Republic of South Sudan embarked on its ‘permanent’ constitution building process which is a critical part of the peace process. The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) puts forward mechanisms and institutions for achieving such ambition. These institutions include the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC),[1] National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), Preparatory Sub-Committee, National Constitutional Conference (NCC) and the reconstituted transitional national legislature (Council of States and Transitional National Legislative Assembly) acting as a constituent assembly. The R-ARCSS establishes the above institutions with varying powers and degree of influence on the constitution building process.
This article focuses on the role of the reconstituted national legislature – bicameral chambers composed of Council of States and Transitional National Legislative Assembly. According to the R-ARCSS, these two houses of parliament are to be transformed into a Constituent Assembly to adopt, in a joint session, the Draft Constitutional Text passed by the National Constitutional Conference.[2]