Constitutional Implications of General Akol Koor’s House Arrest

Mark-DengAuthor: Mark A.W. Deng
Melbourne Law School

Summary

This piece provides a critical analysis of General Akol Koor Kuch’s house arrest from a legal and constitutional perspective. It makes two principal arguments: 1) in placing General Akol under house arrest without having been formally charged with a crime and sentenced by a court of law, the executive government of South Sudan has assumed the fundamental function of courts to determine and award punishment for violations of laws;2) the house arrest violates General Akol’s personal liberty and fair trial protected in the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011.

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Why the Sudan’s case against the UAE at the ICJ has limited prospects of success

Author: Zwelithini Eugene Xaba
International lawyer

On Thursday 6 March 2025, Sudan initiated proceedings against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ/Court) alleging the violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention).[1] The application relates to the ongoing conflict in the territory of the Sudan, between its armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allied militia groups.[2] Sudan alleges that the UAE has violated Article 1 of the Genocide Convention as well as “other fundamental obligations…including by attempting to commit genocide; conspiring to commit genocide; inciting genocide; complicity in genocide; and failing to prevent and punish genocide.”[3] Sudan alleges that since 2023 the RSF has perpetrated a genocide against the Masalit, a Black African ethnic group resident in the West Darfur region, 2000 kilometers away from Khartoum, with the financial, political, and military support of the UAE.[4] The Government of Sudan alleges that acting under the military command and with the direct assistance of Emirati militants, the RSF has killed thousands of Masalit people of all ages as well as engaged in forcible displacement; rape and blockade of humanitarian assistance with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.[5] Sudan has also requested the indication of provisional measures pursuant to Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Articles 73 to 75 of the Rules of Court.

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Peeling back the mask: Analysing the juxtaposition of marital rape and its legalese in Kenya

Author: James Mulei
Kabarak University

“You are mad!” Resian screamed at him. “You are stark mad if you think I am your wife. He repeated quietly, smiling “Whether you scream your heart out, or jump into the deep sea, Resian, you are mine. You are my wife from now henceforth! Let us see how ‘educated’ your body is.” *

The juxtaposition of marital rape has been a subject of discussion, spanning several years if not centuries. Ideally, juxtaposition here refers to contrasting the concept of rape within marriage. Why would a man rape his wife if they are married? Isn’t rape characterised by unconsented sex, where ‘unlawful’ penetration must occur? The immunity of a husband had a long historical tradition, framed by British common law. The immunity of husbands was established by the eminent judge and jurist Sir Matthew Hale in 1736, where he pointed out that a husband cannot be guilty of rape upon his wife for a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife, as marriage implied consent. This theory treated marriage as a contractual agreement where sex was an obligation, making it impossible to prosecute marital rape.[1] This implied that a husband is incapable of raping his wife, meaning that any sexual acts perpetuated within the marriage could not be subject to judicial scrutiny.[2]

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